The annual proxy for this fashion retailer had the following proposals:
- Proforma votes on directors, appointment of auditors, and “say-on-pay” advisory vote
- Shareholder vote regarding eliminating supermajority voting requirements
Magni voted as follows:
- Magni voted for and against the proforma proposals.
-For all but one director – The board has a majority of independent directors and some have CEO/CFO experience with other companies. The compensation of directors is disclosed with a meaningful portion in equity where the equity has restrictions to align director incentives with long-term value creation. The compensation levels are set using a benchmarking process. Against Abigail Wexner as only one Wexner should be on the board.
-For auditors – There appear to be no controversies with the financial statements of the company.
–For “Say-on-pay” Advisory Vote. The proxy materials demonstrated that the board has more than considered shareholder feedback on executive compensation. In addition, the proxy materials disclosed the benchmarking done on executive compensation, including listing the peer group used in the benchmarking.
- Magni voted for shareholder proposal to eliminate supermajority voting requirements. Strong shareholder relationships mean avoiding governance structures that reduce or eliminate the impact of shareholder votes. Governance structures with supermajority voting requirements are inconsistent with strong shareholder relationships.